The dynamics of tacit learning in organisations : a system view by Powell, John
John Powell
August 2011
The dynamics of tacit learning in organisations: a system view
Inaugural lecture delivered August 2011
Prof John Powell
Professor of Strategy
University of Stellenbosch Business School
Editor: SU Language Centre
Design: Heloïse Davis
Printing: rsamprinters@gmail.com
ISBN: 978-0-7972-1326-5
Copyright ©Stellenbosch University Language Centre
Prof John Powell is the Director of the University ofStellenbosch Business School. John started his studies in
engineering at Cambridge University and received his PhD at
Cranfield Royal Military College of Science. At both
institutions he received various awards for excellence. He
started his working career in the Royal Navy and then joined
British Aerospace (BAe) as a systems engineer. After being
awarded a fellowship, John decided to pursue an academic
career. He gained lectureships at Cranfield and Bath University
and, in due course, assumed the chair of strategic analysis. He
subsequently held similar posts at Southampton and Cardiff
Universities. John’s research programme is highly applied in nature and can be
divided into three main streams, namely the use of scenario methods for the
identification of corporate strategy; systems-based methods for strategic manage -
ment; and semi-formal and formal approaches to knowledge strategy. John has
published his research in numerous academic articles and in books, and has
applied it in consultancy contracts with various high-profile organisations.

WHY IS TACIT KNOWLEDGE
IMPORTANT TO ORGANISATIONS?
All knowledge is important to an organisation. Whileit is not (contrary to a wide body of opinion
[Anand and Khanna, 2000; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001;
Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004]) the only asset worthy of
consideration in the strategy of an organisation, it holds
a unique place in that register of assets in so far as
without knowledge, the complex trading of a company,
by which value is added by the firm to a set of input
factors, becomes reduced to such purely mechanistic
value-adding processes as translation (to a place where
the input factor is more highly valued) or storage (to
await more favourable selling conditions) [Cowan and
David, 2000; Ford, 1997, 1998; Swart and Henneberg,
2007; Swart and Kinnie, 2003, 2010]. Such limited
business is rarely all that is desired by an organisation.
Tacit knowledge (by which is meant all knowledge
which cannot be codified, or made explicit – explicated
[Polanyi, 1966; Swart, 2006), specifically, holds a
particularly important place in the asset base for a
number of reasons. Firstly, it is itself a form of
knowledge (or of knowing, if preferred) and as such
contributes, potentially, to the ability of an organisation
to deliver its valued outputs [Kinnie, Swart and Purcell,
2004]. Secondly, it has certain attributes, primarily
because of the way in which it is created in an
organisation, which make it more difficult to identify,
and even detect, from the outside, and so (as is shown
later in this paper) it presents a natural contributor to
the desirable ‘causal ambiguity’ by which strategic
advantage is protected from predation and decay [Grant
and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Tsoukas, 1996]. 
Tacit knowledge, then, is of fundamental concern in
the knowledge management and strategy of an
organisation and it is hardly an exaggeration to observe
that, with a certain flexibility of definition, the strategic
aim of an organisation is to ensure that, at any time, the
requisite knowledge is available in order for value to be
added to the input factors
MODELS OF KNOWING
Ensuring the availability of tacit knowledge within thefirm in practice, however, is an affair charged with
difficulties because of the essential nature of tacit
knowledge: we can talk about it, but we cannot describe
how we know it [Bowman and Swart, 2007]. Some
authorities claim that the most effective way of de -
scribing how we know it is to attempt the capturing of
that knowledge into the explicit domain, where it is
easier to manage the transfer of knowledge, since, by de -
fi nition, explicit knowledge can be transferred explicitly. 
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ABSTRACT
A decade of scholarly and practitioner work in knowledge management has shown that the tacit dimension of
knowing is critically important. It is important, firstly, because tacit knowledge demonstrably exists – ignoring it
would create a fatal gap in the management of the resources of the organisation. Secondly, tacit knowledge
possesses interesting and useful strategic properties; because it is less accessible to persons outside the
organisation it is more difficult to detach the tacit knowledge from its owner(s).
There are well-known frameworks for explaining the behaviour of tacit and explicit knowledge but they
possess one major and one minor gap. The less significant lacuna is the general absence of consideration of that
component of knowing which is not merely inexpressible (thus tacit), but is unknown, i.e. the knower is unaware
of her/his knowing. More significantly, work deriving from intelligence systems stresses the importance of that
knowing which is of a systemic nature, as opposed to knowing of a localised, or ‘point’, nature. An extensive body
of work now exists which takes this system view of knowledge into account, but little exists in terms of frameworks
for understanding how this systemic knowledge behaves dynamically.
Some practical experiences are described in the form of mini-cases, which collectively give indications of the
conditions under which tacit knowledge (of both forms) is likely to be co-created in the organisation. These are
brought together in an informal structure for guiding managers in creating the conditions for that co-creation.
6The model is as follows.
We conceive of a person as having repositories of
both tacit and explicit knowledge. 
Knowledge, it is asserted, can be brought from the
tacit to the explicit level by a process of explication
[Baumard, 1999]. 
There is some variety in the views on what this process
constitutes but, in essence, it is generally seen as a
proceduralisation of the tacit knowing, so that the steps
of the process and the components of sense-making can
be stated explicitly and hence defined for use by others
[Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995]. The model assumes that
tacit knowledge cannot be transferred directly from one
person’s tacit knowing into another’s. After all, how
could we possibly transfer to another something that
we cannot explain? It has to pass up and over, using the
explication process as the medium of transfer.
There are difficulties with this approach, however.
First, even in a narrow interpretation of knowledge
management as constituting the capturing of knowledge
in explicit form, two issues of strategic practice come to
light, namely 
 the extent to which we should apply the scarce re -
sources of the firm, and apply them to the particular
activity of knowledge capture rather than to other
worthy causes, such as physical and human resource
building, brand management, organisational develop -
ment and others [Grant, 1998; Purcell et al., 2004],
and
 the extent to which, as we make knowledge explicit
(‘capture’ it), we make it available to others to
exploit [Swart and Henneberg, 2007].
Figure 3 shows how, in terms of the explication of
knowledge, the efficiency of capture becomes less as
we proceed to explicate knowledge more and more.
We express this through a concept of resistivity, i.e. the
amount of resource required to capture a given
amount of knowledge. Little argument needs be applied
to indicate the broad shape of the efficiency curve.
Asking an expert, say a gardener, what she knows
about horti culture will produce massive availability of
basic knowledge rather quickly. One simple question
will elicit a flood of what is known about which flowers
grow well in certain conditions, what the feeding and
watering regime should be, how photosynthesis works
and so on. Soon, however, the questions become more
difficult to phrase and the answers less certain. ‘How
do you design a flower bed, then?’ will elicit both a 
long pause before the phrasing of an answer and
conside rable mental effort in clarifying the deep tacit
knowledge immanent in the skill of garden design.
While the ques tion is well-defined, the informant will
have to work hard to explicate the aesthetic rules of
design. 
Figure 3 represents one of the main accepted views of
knowledge management, where, by the application 
of more and more resources, we can eventually capture
as much of the knowledge resident in an organisation 
as we wish. Even with this simple view of knowledge
manage ment, there are resource application issues.
Simply, the firm must decide how much knowledge risk
Figure 1: Explicit and tacit knowing are linked by explication
Figure 2: Tacit knowing is transferred only through the
layer of explicit knowing
Figure 3: As we capture knowledge it becomes more
difficult to capture the remainder
7[Kahaner, 1996] it wishes to take. By knowledge risk
(KR), following Kahaner’s conception, we mean the
likelihood that, under a given future circumstance, the
knowledge available in the firm to meet the needs of
that circumstance will prove insufficient. For example,
one can imagine the decision to engage in a research
project to meet a predicted demand for functionality in
consumer goods, or a decision to invest in knowledge
capture to reduce the loss of available knowledge
should, say, skilled sales staff be poached by a
competitor.
Clearly, as investment is made in making knowledge
available (capturing it), the KR will reduce (see Figure 4).
There is, however, another issue, which is that if we
make knowledge available (in the strict sense of
capturing and explicating it), we will increase the com -
petitive intelligence risk (CIR) [Powell and Bradford,
2000], which captures the idea that explicated
knowledge is more easily available for acquisition by
com petitors. Figure 5 shows that, as the knowledge
available increases, the CIR increases, and there will be
an optimum level of explication that balances the KR
and the CIR. In other words, it does not make sense for
the firm to attempt a complete explication, not only
because of the scarcity of resources but also because of
considerations of the competitive risks inherent in
explication. What is written down is vulnerable.
This view of knowledge availability as a matter of cap -
ture is unnecessarily and unhelpfully narrow, however.
First, the idea that making knowledge available to
the firm for business use is simply a matter of capturing
the tacit, of explication of the tacit into the explicit, is
untenable. It is not only desirable, but demonstrably
pos sible, to transfer tacit knowledge directly from a
tacit to a tacit domain; indeed, it is the main purpose of
this paper to uncover those characteristics of an orga -
nisation that would facilitate tacit-to-tacit transfer.
Thus, the idea of knowledge capture is replaced by the
associated idea of knowledge availability. The view that
knowledge availa bili ty results merely from capture and
explication implies that only knowledge made explicit is
available. Here it is argued that, to the extent that a)
tacit knowledge can be transferred without explication
and b) knowledge can be co-created in an organisation,
the available knowledge is greater than that which has
been explicated.
Second, the interaction of KR and CIR is such that,
when the unexplicated tacit knowledge is included in
the available knowledge set of the firm, the KR profile
can be improved (see Figure 6).
Figure 4: Knowledge risk reduces as more knowledge is
made available to the firm
Figure 6: If unexplicated tacit knowledge is included, 
the available knowledge can be increased
Figure 5: Accommodation between KR and CIR leads to
an appropriate level of capture
Because the available knowledge is not
merely that which is explicated, the CIR
curve rises less sharply as the available
knowledge is increased. Only that part of
the available knowledge deriving from the
explication process is vulnerable directly;
that portion of the knowledge made
available by tacit-tacit transfer and co-
creation is not directly vulnerable. Hence
the optimum point of knowledge ‘capture’
(which now includes that transferred by
tacit-tacit means) is greater. Clearly the
issue of the opportunity cost of resource
expenditure remains, and that can only be
addressed within the financial specifics of
the firm, but from a pure KM per spective it is now safer
to make more knowledge availa ble and, as a result, the
firm will be better prepared to meet an uncertain
future.
There are, then, significant business advantages to
be gained should we be able to make available know -
ledge that is relevant to the future business problem
other than that deriving from the tacit-explicit-explicit-
tacit (t-e-e-t) process [Kinnie, Swart and Purcell, 2005].
We therefore seek a direct transfer of knowledge (if
such a thing were possible) from one person’s tacit
knowing to another’s. We refer to the supporting con -
text and processes of this tacit-tacit diffusion as the tacit
learning environment (TLE), in contrast with the explicit
learning environment, which underlies much of the
‘explication school’ of organisational learning.
Figure 8 defines some terms needed in the subsequent
discussion.
 Declaration we define as the process by which un -
known (i.e. unrecognised tacit knowledge (TKu) is
brought into the awareness of the knower and is
brought from the domain of what is not known but
is nevertheless enacted into the domain of con -
scious tacit knowledge (TKc).
 Explication is the process by which known tacit
knowledge (TKc) is codified and captured into the
explicit domain.
 Explicit transfer is the diffusion of explicit knowledge
within the explicit domain from one participant to
another (we include groups as well as individuals).
 Individuation is the internalisation of explicit knowledge
into the tacit domain of the recipient.
The objectives of the TLE are threefold:
a) To engender tacit-to-tacit knowledge transfer and,
by implication, the co-creation of knowledge.
b) To assist in the individuation of knowledge (its
expression back into the tacit knowledge of the
recipient under the t-e-e-t architecture).
c) To assist in the declaration of TKu.
‘STRUCTURALISATION’ OF
KNOWLEDGE – THE SYSTEMS
DIMENSION
Localised versus systemic knowing
While the distinction between EK, TKc and TKu is
critical to our understanding of how knowledge is 
co-created and disseminated within the organisation,
there is another consideration which, we shall see later,
bears strongly on the practical organisation of that
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Figure 7: We seek a direct tacit-tacit transfer through an
appropriate learning environment
Figure 8: Terms used in the TLE discussion
9management of knowledge. This consideration is the
span of concern of the material that is claimed to be
known. We can claim to know small things and great
things in system terms:1 In the system in which we
operate, some of our knowing is localised; I know that
cumulus clouds often bring rain. Such ‘point knowledge’
[Powell and Bradford, 2000] is valuable, but, it is argued,
not as valuable as a more systemic knowledge of why
these particular atmospheric features generate rain. In
our opinion, in the latter case our understanding, being
based on the causal mechanism of precipitation (in this
instance), allows better prediction, deeper under -
standing and enhanced prospects for development and
extrapolation [Leonard and Strauss, 1998;
Nonaka, 1995; Powell and Bradford, 2000;
Swart and Powell, 2005].
The extent to which the known attaches
itself to the system as a whole as opposed to
some localised material fact is referred to
here as the degree of structuralisation. A
high degree of system understanding (know -
ing how convection currents, airflow dyna -
mics, thermal gradients, etc. work to gether
to create rainfall in a cumulus cloud) has a
high structuralisation, whereas the simple,
almost childlike knowing that cumu lus clouds
bring rain is nevertheless valid, but of low
structuralisation. We shall see later that the
degree of structuralisation of knowledge in
an organisation is important in terms of its
relevance and usefulness to an organisation,
but also determines to a great extent how
we should manage the dissemination and
cre ation of knowledge in a firm.
Structuralisation in tacit and
explicit knowing
An extended example might serve to illus trate how
structuralisation and the tacit-explicit distinction serve
together to categorise knowledge.
The knowledge domain that we will use to illustrate
this connection is that of seamanship and navigation. We
have chosen this for particular reasons. Firstly, it is an
area of human endeavour familiar to the writer, who has
observed it at close quarters for many decades.
Secondly, it is sufficiently accessible to most readers.
Thirdly, and most importantly, it is an area of activity
where EK, TKc and TKu are strongly evidenced and,
moreover, where systemic knowing is of demonstrable
validity and importance. Our subject is an individual
rather than an organisational group. He has some 40
years of experience and is both an experienced seaman
(having accumulated some 10 000 nautical miles of jour -
neying in sailboats) and an RYA2 instructor of sailing and
seamanship. We shall examine the way in which this
person’s knowing can be categorised according to the
two characteristics, structuralisation and the tacit-ex -
plicit distinction. 
Table 1 shows the framework.
We see in Table 1 that explicit knowledge is authen -
ticated by explication, by the declaration and public
availability of the codified knowledge, whereas tacit
knowledge is authenticated not by declaration, but by
observation. The authentication of TKc and TKu, how -
ever, is very different. The former is authenticated
directly by the self-knowledge of the knower, whereas
TKu is authenticated only through observation of the
actions that imply the existence of unconscious
knowledge on the part of the actor. 
We now proceed to populate the shaded area of
1. One is reminded of the timeless fable of the fox who knows many small things and the hedgehog who knows but one great
thing. The hedgehog is an effective ‘point-knower’, but the fox is a ‘system-knower’, albeit not a very powerful one.
2. The Royal Yachting Association certificates sailing and navigation instruction worldwide. It is based in the UK.
  
Degree of 
structuralisation 
  
  
Point 
data 
 
Connective 
knowledge 
 
System 
knowledge 
 
Authen-
ticator 
Basis 
Explicit 
 
 
 
 
 
  
public 
declared 
know-
ledge 
Tacit 
TKc 
 
 
 
 
 
  
self 
self-
knowing 
TKu 
 
 
 
 
 
  
third party 
observer 
action of 
observed 
Table 1: Framework for categorisation of knowledge
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Table 1 with examples of the knowledge of our infor -
mant (see Table 2).
Sailing a boat is a multi-dimensional experience deman -
ding a huge spread of point, connective and systemic
knowledge. An experienced sailor, attuned to the
feeling of the boat, will wake not only when the noise of
the boat against the water alters (Table 2 – bottom left
corner), but will do so without knowing why. Ex -
perienced sailors will utilise more complex (systemic)
knowledge, altering sails, for example, without really
being aware that they do so. As the bottom row
of Table 2 we show examples of more complex,
systemic knowledge exhibited by a third party. 
Much of the knowledge exhibited by our in -
formant is TKc. For example, he can tell us when
the tide has turned without being able to see the
obvious clues, such as which way boats in the
immediate area are facing.3 He also knows
exactly when to reduce the amount of sail
carried by a boat, taking into account a huge
variety of factors. When asked how he does this,
he answers, “I don’t really know, but I can tell
you that if you don’t take [the wave shape] into
account you could well get it wrong”. This is,
without question, TKc of a highly systemic
nature.
Explicated knowledge is very common in
sailing and navigation and forms the basis of
most training. Our respondent is an expert
teacher and trainer and has no difficulty (where
it is possible) in expressing his tacit knowledge.
When pressed, for example, he explains in great
detail how he knows that when the tidal flow is
strong (so-called ‘spring tides’), a heavy sea
declines more quickly compared with when the
tidal flows are weak (top centre box of Table 2).
Nevertheless, there is much in what he knows
that cannot be explicated.
The contention of this paper, supported by
Powell and Bradford [2000], is that systemic
knowledge is more valuable for the firm in the
sense that knowledge which is applicable to a
wider system is inherently more useful than
knowledge which is localised in its scope. This is
apparently not always the case. One can think of
examples where a piece of point data (the price
at which a competitor will enter a commodity
market, for example) is of great use, but a
moment’s thought will show that even in this
extreme case, the point data is important only
when mobilised within the system understanding
of the effects of such a price entry upon the
market dynamics. Generally speaking then, and
  Degree of structuralisation 
  
Point data 
 
Connective 
knowledge 
 
System 
knowledge 
 
Explicit 
 
‘Note that 
when the tide 
turns, the 
water flows the 
other way in 
the river.’ 
 
 
‘If the tide runs 
strongly, more 
wave energy is 
lost in the 
disturbed 
motion of the 
water, so the 
sea dies down 
more quickly.’ 
‘I have a full 
hydrodynamic 
and 
aerodynamic 
model of the 
boat, its 
environment 
and how they 
interact to 
cause motion 
and movement 
of the hull. 
Here it is.’ 
Tacit 
TKc 
 
‘The stream 
has turned’ 
(but I don’t 
know why I 
know) 
 
 
‘The sea dies 
down more 
quickly after a 
storm if the 
tide is running 
strong’ (but I 
can’t explain 
why) 
‘I know when 
to reduce sail 
by taking into 
account the 
strength of the 
crew, the 
weather, the 
position, the 
sea state, the 
balance of the 
boat. All these 
work together.’ 
(but I can’t 
explain how 
they work 
together.) 
TKu 
 
‘The skipper 
wakes up when 
the noise of the 
boat alters.’ 
(but he 
doesn’t realise 
he does so)  
‘I notice that 
Jeremy makes 
the boat turn 
into the wind 
whenever 
there’s a gust.’  
‘Fred fiddles 
with the sails 
all the time 
according to 
the strength of 
wind, the sea 
state and the 
speed of the 
boat.’ (but he 
doesn’t realise 
he does so) 
Table 2: Examples of types of knowledge drawn from 
navigation and seamanship
3. Readers from Mediterranean countries will need to know that, as the tide turns, streams reverse, causing boats to swing on
their moorings. 
subject to the resources needed, our learning
environment will add value to the firm if it can expand
knowledge in the direction of the right-hand side of
Figure 9, towards system understanding rather than
point data.
The same clean position cannot, however, be
adopted in respect of the degree of explication (the
vertical axis of Figure 9). There is no assumption here
that explicit system knowledge is better than tacit
system knowledge and, indeed, arguments surrounding
the CI risk illuminated earlier in this paper show that a
mix of tacit and explicit knowledge is likely to be a
desirable output of the learning environment.
SOME OBSERVATIONS FROM
PRACTICE
Sharing knowledge, be it explicit or tacit, is a commonfeature of cooperative endeavour; indeed, one can
almost characterise cooperation in terms of knowledge
sharing and co-creation alone. Unless the protagonists
are prepared to share a common understanding (or at
least to aspire to such sharing), there is little point in
conversing. 
The examples which follow are drawn from a field
of cooperation which is well-documented, namely the
cooperation of professional, high-technology workers
in projects. It happens that our examples derive from
the defence industry, but they stand as typical of
professional cooperative endeavours. Three situations
are described, illustrating some common themes in the
way in which knowledge was or was not effectively co-
created during its trajectory The transfer of knowledge
and the co-creation of knowledge when specialists from
different companies and resident experts from the civil
service come together in project teams, often for sub -
stantial periods of time, form a common thread through
these examples.
The 4.5” Mk8 Mod 1 Naval gun
The standard naval gun for the Royal Navy for many
years has been the 4.5” Mk8, designed and manufac -
tured by Royal Ordnance plc (RO). A requirement for
a replacement gun system, the 4.5” Mk 8 Mod 1,
emerged and the project was put out to tender by the
UK government, it being that government’s policy not
to grant sole-tender contracts. 
There was, however, a problem common to many
projects deriving from a country’s strategic defence
industrial base, namely that, because of the high invest -
ments required to maintain a world position in
technology in this specialised area, only one entity (RO)
was in a position to design the new gun system. It was
decided to run a competition solely for the manufacture
of the gun. There was an aspiration that subsequently
this would have the potential to engender increased
competition, in that were a bidder other than RO to
win the competition for the manufacturing, design
knowledge would be transferred as dialogue took place
between RO and the new bidder. In our terms there
was an expectation that knowledge would be trans -
ferred, both explicit (in the form of design books) and
tacit (in the sense of design know-how), from the design
authority to the winner of the manufacturing com -
petition. When that knowledge was transferred, it
would be possible, in the future, to satisfy government
competition policy by running both a design and a
manufacture competition for subsequent projects in
this area. Such governmental endeavours are common
throughout the world of defence procurement [Sandler
and Hartley, 1995].
The competition was run and, as was discreetly
hoped, a bidder other than RO indeed won. This
company, Devonport Management Limited (DML), was
skilled in the fitting and maintenance of such naval guns
and, at first, it was hoped that not only would design
know-how migrate from RO to DML, but even that the
DML knowledge of the guns’ performance in service
would enhance the design capabilities of RO. All looked
well for the co-creation of knowledge between the two
contenders.
But then RO looked at its costs. Maintaining an
expensive design team with a dramatically reduced
11
Figure 9: Schema for characterising the learning
environment
expectation of attracting lucrative manufacturing work
under the new competitive regime no longer made
sense to RO. Essentially, because of the stringent
govern mental competitive policy, DML was able to take
a rent on RO’s investment in design know-how. RO
decided to shut down its naval gun design team, de -
ploying some to related land systems, but losing the
integrity of the design team in the process. 
The effect was catastrophic for the UK govern -
ment’s competition policy in this somewhat specialised
area. Co-creation of knowledge simply ceased. Not only
was the knowledge transfer from RO to DML now
limited to explicit, contracted design material, but any
co-creation of knowledge by the back-transfer of DML’s
in-service knowledge to RO ceased before it had
started.
The Astute nuclear submarine joint team
Another, more successful attempt to transfer pro -
fessional knowledge between and among designers and
other specialists occurred in the UK submarine industry
in the period between 1993 and 2003. The Astute
project was a complicated one, aimed at pro viding a
replacement for the Trafalgar class nuclear attack
submarine. It went through a number of phases, some
of which ran out of funds in attempting to advo cate
wholly new designs, but in essence it was the em -
bodiment of a government competition policy aimed at
improving the competitive dynamics of the nuclear
submarine industry, while at the same time procuring a
much-needed new build of enhanced nuclear fleet
(attack) submarines. 
Essentially there was only one supplier at the be -
ginning, namely Vickers Ship Engineering Ltd (VSEL),
based in north-western England. This was viewed as
inadequate in two respects. Firstly, as a matter of
competition policy it was deemed desirable to have
more than one contender for submarine design and
manufacture and, while the French submarine industry
provided a ready theoretical source of competitive
pressure, it was recognised that in-country competition
would be less problematic in terms of the security
issues surrounding nuclear design matters. A group of
four companies (Rolls Royce, VSEL, British Aerospace
and GEC) were brought together to develop an initial
design and subsequently to bid for more detailed design
and manufacture.
These four companies provided specialists with
backgrounds in submarine matters together with their
own specialist expertise. For example, the GEC
company brought ex-naval submariners who had de -
veloped digital system expertise in torpedo launch and
sonar detection systems, while the Rolls Royce (RR)
contingent was able to talk with authority about the
placement of the nuclear steam plant in the hull of the
submarine. The two teams had a common language of
submarine operation and could work together to
create, for example, knowledge about how to design so
that the noise originating in the nuclear plant would not
unduly affect the ability of the submarine sonar systems
to detect other vessels. There was a clear combination
of common knowledge from the design environment as
well as the bringing in of specialist expertise.
Things went well; an effective design team was formed
and made progress with a design, motivated by a clearly
agreed memorandum of understanding be tween all four
companies. The team spent many months working and
playing together. There were competitions to design
rafts to race on the English Lakes at weekends, as well
as serious, committed, late-night design reviews. Impor -
tant project positions were shared between the
companies, so that the four firms’ employees formed an
impression of a joint endeavour. While VSEL were the
titular head of the group, there was no doubt about the
importance and contribution of the other companies’
experts.
There was also a fifth body of experts, namely the
Specialist Professional Engineers (SPEs) of the UK
scientific civil service. Prior to the initiatives underlying
the setting up of the four-company group, design autho -
rity had been vested in these SPEs, in that responsibility
for the performance of the design remained with the
Crown. The SPEs were important people but, with the
arrival of the four-company design team (which held
clear design authority under contractual conditions of
liability), they were relegated to the role of advisors.
Moreover, their advice was, in essence, unwanted or at
best unusable, since their ability to understand the
commercial context of the risk judgements being made
in the design team was limited because of their dedi ca -
tion to a career only in the public service. Their advice
was aimed at minimising risk rather than optimising it –
a crucial difference.
Relations between the SPEs and the design team
dete riorated. There was an initial expectation that both
sides would work together to co-create knowledge
about the design deriving from (on the part of the SPEs)
the operational requirement and context, ‘how we did
things before’ and deep specialised technical knowledge,
and (on the part of the four companies’ designers) how
experience in other, adjacent domains and an integrated
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approach to system design could assist in producing a
better submarine. The reality proved very different. The
SPEs’ inputs were minimised. The industrial designers
avoided meetings with the SPEs. There was little or no
social contact. The SPEs exacerbated the situation by
appealing to contractual conditions which served only
to amplify the perceived differences in position between
the contractor and the contract authority. It became a
‘them’ and ‘us’ situation and both parties lost thereby.
Stealth projects in the European
aerospace industry
The final example is set in the late 1980s, when stealth
technology, and in particular radar cross-section
reduction, became a critical design issue in the world
aerospace industry. Two teams, concentrating sepa -
rately on Electromagnetics and on Aerodynamics, were
set up in British Aerospace to develop the precursor to
the Typhoon (Eurofighter). Radar cross-section
reduction, while not a central feature of the design,
never theless was a material issue. This was a very highly
classified aspect of the design and the team in aero dy na -
mics, dealing with the general aerodynamic arrangement
of the aircraft, was not allowed to talk to the elec tro -
magnetics team, which was responsible for the detecta -
bility of the design by threat radar systems and the
system effect on the electronic warfare suite of the
aircraft. Both teams understood the requirements and
the operational context extremely well, and there was
a high degree of motivation to share the useful
differences in underlying expertise between members of
the two teams. 
Two things seemed to prevent the co-creation of
knowledge, however. First was the obvious constraint
of the security environment. Initially, discussing such
highly confidential design aspects across the boundary
of the Electromagnetics Department was a disciplinary
affair – you could literally lose your job. Secondly, there
was little or no professional motivation so to do. There
was little understanding on the part of the electro -
magnetics people of the dramatic effect of (what they
saw as) minor changes to trailing edge design on aero-
elastic and aerodynamic performance, while the
aerodynamics specialists had no appreciation for the
equally dramatic effects on warfare capability of radar
cross-section reduction. There was, for example, blank
amazement about and distrust of the results of a study
by the electromagnetics staff presented at one of the
few formalised design reviews, where it was shown that
a modest radar cross-section reduction was equivalent
in its contribution to medium-range air combat capa bi -
lity of a weight reduction of 30%, an unthinkably ambi -
tious achievement by conventional means. 
Soon reason dawned and the security fence was
widened to include both teams, who soon reverted to
their natural state of mutual trust and socialisation
under the common endeavours of enhancing their own
professional knowledge and their commitment to the
design of the aircraft that would secure their futures.
They talked freely and without formality, and the stealth
design progressed impressively fast.
SYSTEM CONSIDERATIONS:
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
TRANSFER
We can draw some clear messages from these vicarious
experiences in respect of the conditioning factors which
lead to the co-creation (or otherwise) of knowledge.
Existence
When, as was the case in the 4.5” gun example, one of
the parties ceases to exist, it is self-evident that co-
creation of knowledge will also cease.
Capacity of channel
To the extent that knowledge is transferred between
parties (rather than being created anew in the reci -
pient’s mind), all three examples lead us to consider
whether there is a straightforward issue of the capacity
of the channel between the parties being adequate to
support the transfer of knowledge and whatever under -
lies the transfer of knowledge. Below, we discuss the
way in which, for example, the absence of a common
experience in the Astute submarine example was a
negative conditioning factor in respect of the ability of
the SPEs to form common cause with the designers.
Conversely, within the four-company group there was
substantial homogeneity of experience, which provided
a basis for common understanding. Similarly, in the
extreme example of the stealth project, the security
environment was not only coercive in and of itself, but
by legislating the very timing and scope of discussion it
clearly constrained the available channel capacity for
knowledge transfer. 
Content of transfer
While the potential of the channel to support
knowledge transfer may be high, there is no guarantee
that knowledge transfer will take place. In the case of
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the Astute programme and the SPEs, for example, there
were many topics even in that area of joint interest in
which the two parties (the SPEs on one hand and the
four companies’ designers on the other) held similar
knowledge. What then is the motivation to expend
effort merely to check common understanding, when
more effective participation in the co-creation of
knowledge can be achieved with a different partner? In
the case of the stealth project, the co-creation mecha -
nism bounded ahead as soon as the security constraints
were lifted, since, with the large channel capacity created
by the high degree of homogeneity of knowledge (the
common knowledge of the firm, structures, technology
and context), the heterogeneity of the electromagnetic
and aerodynamics experts provided ideal circumstances
for the interlinking of new sets of concepts that
comprehended by the Swart-Powell entropy-based
model of knowledge expressed elsewhere [Powell and
Swart, 2008; Swart and Powell, 2005].
Availability function (enthalpy)
Just as the total energy of a system in thermodynamic
systems is not always available for work (the concept of
enthalpy), so not all the knowledge is available for trans -
fer in knowledge systems. Some of it is not available to
the knower because it is tacit and unknown, but even
that which is known (tacit or explicit) is subject to dis -
cretionary application. There is a huge body of litera -
ture that addresses this, usually in terms of trust
between participants [Granovetter, 1973; Lee and Cole,
2003; Lin, 1999; Swart and Kinnie, 2003], and the SPE
case illustrates this issue of trust and mutuality drama -
tically. Where there was perceived mutuality of en -
deavour, knowledge was made available by the
participants in order to further the declared joint aims
of their companies – they shared design rule-books and
stories and myths in equal measure. When, in the case
of the SPEs, there is evidence not just of a lack of
mutuality but an actual attempt to coerce the transfer
of knowledge [as in “You have to tell me how you weigh
risk; it’s a contractual requirement”], we find the prota -
gonists going through the motions of co-creation.
Meetings would take place at which no actual know-
how was transferred. 
One can interpret this in two ways within a model.
First, we can view a coercive environment as a Haber -
masian constraint on communicative rationality (i.e. if
we are coerced, we decline to communicate) and hence
as a diminution of the channel capacity [Habermas,
1981]. We refer to this as contextual conditioning of the
channel of communication. Second, we can interpret it
as a direct demotivation to transfer knowledge itself. In
other words, the channel capacity is large enough, we
have heterogeneous and therefore worthwhile things to
say, but we choose not to because of some perceived
dysbenefit in doing so. We refer to this aspect as
personalised valuation of the availability of knowledge.
We then clearly see a distinction between 
 channel capacity (the ability of the relationship to
support knowledge transfer), 
 rate or quantity of knowledge transfer (the potential
for things not yet known to enter the knowing of
the recipient), and
 the value (positive or negative) of that transfer.
Those familiar with the literature of Information Theory
will see exact parallels with the associated concepts in
the Shannon-Weaver conception of information trans -
fer of communication bandwidth, information measure,
measured by the well-known Shannon-Weaver informa -
tion measure, and the value of that information transfer.
Information Theory indulges in the separation of the
first two points from the second, leaving any commen -
tary on the economic benefit of the transfer to the
economist. Here, however, it has been decided to deal
with the structural issues of channel capacity, knowledge
transfer and the value of that knowledge in one frame -
work, not least because it would prove impossible to
disaggregate the motivations for knowledge transfer
from the underlying structural concepts. Put simply, the
motivation to transfer knowledge derives from similar
motivational aspects of the social environment to those
that create the channel for communication itself.
Summary of the model
The model, then, of the way in which knowledge is co-
created in these situations begins with the idea that a
protagonist has both explicit and tacit knowledge (both
known and unknown) and that a fraction of that
knowledge is available in the sense that, to the extent
that knowledge is known or known about, free will
exists as to the desirability of transferring that knowledge
to another. In the case of explicit knowledge, of course,
the process of transfer is more visible to the transferor,
whereas in the case of tacit (known) knowledge, some
transfer may well be taking place without the conscious
knowledge of the transferand. Similarly, in the case of
tacit (unknown) knowledge, the very existence of the
transferand and the process of transfer will be invisible
to the transferor (but not necessarily invisible to the
recipient) (see Figure 10).
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When protagonists engage in communicative discourse,
the conditions may be such that the co-creation of
knowledge becomes possible. We discuss the condi -
tions under which this is possible below, but where this
is so, the amount of knowledge is increased and the
participants can make that knowledge available for fur -
ther communicative discourse, or not (see Figure 11).
It is the main subject of this paper to explore the con -
ditions under which that co-created knowledge is great
or small and the extent to which the co-created
knowledge is made available (see Figure 12).
CONDITIONING THE KNOWLEDGE
ENVIRONMENT
Existence
In the examples we have given, the continued existence
of the protagonists was a function of the capacity of the
host company to support the allocation of resources to
that protagonist. The design authority (RO) in the naval
gun example had no economic case for continuing to
invest in supporting a high-cost specialised design func -
tion when it could not take an economic rent on that
investment. We can generalise this to include all aspects
of force majeure, but it is worth noting that not all force
majeure is applied directly by the owners of the
knowledge resource. In the naval gun example it was, in
fact, the indirect action of the contracting authority
(Her Majesty’s government), which ensured the even -
tual disappearance of one side of the co-creating dyad.
The irony of the situation is that, in the very act of
attempting to ensure a dyad of co-creation by engen -
dering competition in a claustrophobic monopoly, Her
Majesty’s government ensured the disappearance of the
very source of that competition.
Sometimes the disappearance of one side of the
dyad can be less obvious. For example, the nature of an
organisation can change gradually over the life of the co-
creation, so that the self-definition of the organisation
can change incrementally, but so radically, that it makes
no sense to talk of the organisation remaining the same.
An example of this is the effect of very long-term agree -
ments to collaborate on technology. Over the years,
the competitive and regulatory context of Ame rican
and UK firms has changed gradually but drama tically, so
that an agreement to collaborate technically that was
set up in 1980 will have little meaning when considered
25 years later from the perspective of the consolidated
American and UK aerospace industries and under the
markedly different competitive policy contexts of the
Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defence
respectively.
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Figure 10: Protagonists possess both explicit and tacit
knowledge, some of which they make available for transfer
Figure 13: Co-creation requires the continuing existence 
of two parties
Figure 11: Available co-created knowledge emerges from
the process of communicative discourse
Figure 12: The amount of available co-created knowledge
can vary according to the conditions
Capacity of channel
We observe in the examples above (and from others)
that the channel capacity which creates the potential for
co-creation and transfer of knowledge is conditioned by
a number of factors. These can be divided into two
groups, namely those deriving from the relativity of the
knowledge structures in the dyad (the homogeneity of
these structures) and those deriving from the extent to
which the coercive or controlling nature of the context
conditions the channel capacity (see Figure 14).
Clearly, the frequency and effectiveness of contact be -
tween the protagonists is important. If a piano student
is limited to being taught only one hour per year she will
clearly not command sufficient channel capacity to make
adequate progress, regardless of how excellent the
teacher or how gifted the student. Similarly, in the
project cases above we see that, in the case of the four
companies involved in the Astute programme, the
specialists were co-located whereas the SPEs remained
enclaved in their government institutions, venturing
forth only rarely to engage with the industrial experts.
To a degree, one can interpret the socialisation com -
ponent of social capital as a conditioning factor for
knowledge co-creation in this way. More contact through
social situations will mean a greater channel capacity,
ceteris paribus, in addition to the beneficial effects of
trust-building and perceived mutuality of endeavour. In
the examples above, the stealth project experience of
artificially limiting the channel capacity because of
concerns over the inappropriate dissemination of
classified information was, to begin with, catastrophic.
Only when the channel capacity was increased, by the
relaxation of the security rules to allow communication
between the aerodynamicists and the electromagnetic
experts, did co-creation of knowledge begin to appear.
However, the greatest conditioning factor for high
channel capacity is the degree of homogeneity of know -
ing between the two sides of the co-creating dyad. This
is particularly evident in the case of the stealth project,
where the common experience of the military require -
ment, the technology and the commercial context
created the conditions for co-creation.
We can interpret the contextual conditioning of the
channel capacity through the lens of Habermas’s com -
mu nicative rationality. Habermas’s extended argument
in Theorie des Komunikativen Handelns starts from the
observation that the “concept of communicative ratio -
nality carries with it connotations based ultimately on
the central experience of the unconstrained, uni fying,
consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech…”
(Habermas, 1981a, p. 10). He draws on the work of
Schutz and Luckman in showing how “the teleological
aspect of realising one’s aims (or carrying out one’s plan
of action) and the communicative aspect of … arriving
at an agreement” (Habermas, 1981b, p. 126.) contribute
one with the other to produce strategic action in the
world. In summary, the argument is that the commu -
nicative capacity of a discourse dyad is a function of the
sincerity of the constituent speech acts and that that
communicative capacity is the only sustainable basis for
appropriate action (the teleological aspect above).
This has important consequences in our model of
co-creation, since it leads us to enquire into the degree
of coerciveness (or, to be more positive, the sincerity of
the speech acts) of the surrounding environment. If we
detect high power gradients, extensive localised inte -
rests and coerciveness in the context of the co-cre -
ation, we should, according to Habermas, be suspi cious
of the extent to which rationality can be communicated.
Our procedure then is to investigate the motivations of
the conditioning authorities (in our examples, the
govern ment, the board of directors, the special inte -
rests of the expert groups) in distorting the sincerity of
the discourse. To put it simply, a coercive context will
produce a narrow channel of communication, since
there will be a general motivation not to communicate
for fear of lending hostages to fortune. We shall see
later that the concept of communicative rationality
throws light on the specific valuation of communication,
as well upon the capacity of the channel in general.
Content of transfer
The potential of the channel to support communication
is not enough, however, to ensure the actual transfer.
Just as the homogeneity of the knowledge structures of
16
Figure 14: Channel capacity derives from homogeneity
and external conditioning
the two sides of the discourse dyad engenders commu -
nicative capacity through the expansion of the channel,
so the heterogeneity of those structures ensures the
worth of that transfer and creates the valuation con -
ditions for applying work in exercising the commu -
nicative function. We see this accommodation of hete -
roge neity and homogeneity in previous, more mathe -
matical work [Swart and Powell, 2005], where we show
that, for any knowledge structure, there is an optimum
mix of homogeneity and heterogeneity between the
two knowledge structures. 
By heterogeneity we mean the extent to which the
knowledge sets of the two protagonists are different. In
the case of the stealth project, for example, one could
investigate the spread of essential concepts held to be
relevant by the two parties and find, on the one hand
(for the aerodynamicists) the ideas of aero-elastic beha -
viour, weight, transonic airflow, separation, thermo -
dynamic energy transfer, etc., and on the other hand
(for the electromagnetic experts) that concepts of sur -
face current, resonant structures and reflective confi gu -
rations dominate. Both will hold certain con cepts such
as weight, structural integrity and overall military re -
quire ment in common, but the ways in which the two
parties think about the problem of airframe design are
very different. Heterogeneity is high.
As a consequence, it is worthwhile talking across the
boundary, since, pace our conception of knowledge as
residing in the interconnections of a concept space
[Powell and Swart, 2008; Swart and Powell, 2005], it will
be relatively worthwhile and cost effective to acquire a
new concept (or even a dozen) from this heterodox
group. Moreover, having acquired these new concepts,
the benefit in terms of richness of interconnection in
knotting them into the existing concept space will lead
to a relatively large increase in knowledge in terms of
the richness of interconnections among the members of
the new, enlarged concept space. In practical terms, if
the object of attention is aircraft design (as opposed to
aerodynamics alone), the benefit to an aerodynamicist
of acquiring concepts of radiating structures strongly
informs his understanding of aero-structures. The asso -
ciated opportunity for the co-creation of knowledge
about how the electromagnetic factors of wing design
are linked with the aero-elastic and aerodynamic consi -
derations provides a large boost of knowledge com -
pared with the hard graft of seeking more and more
difficult interconnections among the smaller set of elec -
tromagnetically-uninformed aerodynamics knowledge.
Note that we distinguish between the content of the
transfer, as measured by the establishment of inter -
connections among and between the concept spaces of
the two protagonists, and the valuation of that
knowledge, to which we now turn.
Availability function (enthalpy)
Lastly, we note that the willingness of the protagonists
actually to put work into the knowledge transfer and to
make available the knowledge of which they are aware
is a function of their local valuations of the worth of 
that knowledge transfer. Consequently, it is not the
same as either the channel capacity nor the quantity of
knowledge transferred of itself.
How are the activities enacted for the different
types of K? 
We can deploy this schema of structuralisation and
degree of explication (Figure 9) to enquire how the
knowledge of an organisation develops from point data,
known at the TKu level, towards the more valuable
systemic knowledge, whether that is known at the
explicit, TKc or TKu level. 
Figure 15 shows a very conventional conception of
knowledge growth and dissemination. Here we see that
the joint ambitions are to make explicit and sub -
sequently to grow the applicability (structuralisation) of
the knowledge. 
Figure 16, on the other hand, shows an entirely different
path to explicit system knowledge. Here the struc -
turalisation is achieved at the TKu level, before any
attempt is made to declare and subsequently explicate
that (now system-directed) knowledge. We have seen
an example of this in our informant who is a skilled sea -
man and navigator. His acquisition of TKu knowledge,
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Figure 15: Path 1, declaration - explication -
structuralisation
enacted in the form of intuitively and unconsciously
adjusting the sails on a sailing boat, was acquired
through a process of accretion of point data and their
connections, and integrating these into some system
understanding, which, while it is limited to the relatively
narrow endeavour of setting a sail on a boat in this case,
is nevertheless a substantial example of TKu system
knowledge. During the process of this informant’s
training and development as a sailing instructor, his huge
TKu knowledge is declared and then explicated (in so
far as it can be) into procedures for teaching at the
explicit level, but it is also utilised at the tacit level in his
teaching, as he co-experiences with his students and
they learn from the common observation of the realities 
Such a development path for knowledge runs counter
to the generally expected process of engen dering
explication, of ‘raising’ knowledge from the inaccessible
depths of the tacit unknown and making organisational
knowers more aware of what they know and how they
know it. The alternative route, of growing systemicity in
understanding at the tacit levels before explicating it,
appears counterintuitive, almost unsafe, because, being
submerged, it is unobservable and therefore un -
controlled.
Lastly, one observes that the assumption that sys -
temicity is more valuable than point knowledge (i.e. that
one wishes that knowing in an organisation would pro -
ceed comfortably, visibly towards the top right-hand
corners of these epistemic maps) is, in fact, un -
necessarily strict. What is desirable is to move towards
the right-hand side, towards greater systemicity, but
that systemicity is as likely to be valuable even if tacit.
Thus, even if the paths followed are more in line with
the idea of t-e-e-t development (see Figure 17), the
limitations of which served as the starting point for this
expanded concept, if the result is a greater usefulness
because of a greater systemicity of knowledge, the
result, managerially, is still a desirable one.
SUMMARY
The key managerial conclusions which emerge fromthis study are that
 systemic knowledge vis-à-vis point knowledge is
high ly desirable in the organisation and should be
engendered wherever possible
 systemic knowledge does not need to be explicated
in order to be co-created. Indeed, explicated, syste -
mic knowledge can be created by at least two paths,
namely the accepted route of explication followed
by systematisation, and the route of systemisation at
the tacit (even tacit unknown) level followed by
explication.
 the generation and co-creation of tacit knowledge
in the organisation is subject to these enabling factors:
- Existence of the two co-creating agents.
- The capacity of the channel through which the
communicative acts supporting the co-creation
are enabled. There are many factors relevant to
this, but an important one is the Habermasian
ideal of a power-free speech act, where the
trans fer of knowledge is unencumbered by
power gradients between the co-creators.
- The content of transfer is relevant, as is the
valuation of that content by the co-creators.
- The ‘enthalpy’ or available knowledge is relevant,
since, because of the ‘sticky nature’ of know -
ledge, not all that is wished to be transferred can
be. This places limits on the transfer content.
This paper takes the position that the ubiquitous model
of knowledge development in an organisation, namely
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Figure 16: Path 2, structuralisation - declaration -
explication path
Figure 17: Declaration/explication – structuralisation,
followed by individuation
that tacit knowledge should and indeed must be made
explicit before it can be mobilised and dis se minated, is
unnecessarily restrictive. It is entirely possible to adopt
an approach, which builds on the characteristics of
knowledge co-creation seen in the case examples to
develop tacit knowledge towards a systemic under -
standing before any explication is undertaken. This,
together with the characteristics re sulting from the
cases, is a significant agenda for knowledge ma nage -
ment, stressing as it does the importance in practice of
unexplicated knowledge and transfer. This is not new; it
has been the approach of apprenticeship and pro -
fessional learning for centuries. Neither is it un -
supported in the Knowledge Manage ment literature,
but it provides a complementary and viable route for
knowledge development in the organisation.
19
REFERENCES
Anand, B.N., & Khanna, T. (2000). Do firms learn to
create value? The case of alliances. Strategic
Management Journal, 21: 295-315.
Baumard, P. (1999). Tacit knowledge in organisations.
London: Sage.
Bowman, C., & Swart, J. (2007). Whose human capital?
The challenge of value capture when capital is
embedded. Journal of Management Studies, 
44 (4): 488–505.
Brusoni, S., & Prencipe, A. (2001). Managing knowledge
in loosely coupled networks: exploring the 
links between product and knowledge
dynamics. 
J of Management Studies, 38: 1019–1035.
Granovetter, M.S. (1973). The strength of weak ties.
American Journal of Sociology, 78: 1360–1380.
Grant, R. (1998). The resource-based theory of
competitive advantage: implications for strategy
formulation, in Segal-Horn, S. (Ed.), The Strategy
Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Grant, R.M., & Baden-Fuller, C. (2004). A knowledge
accessing theory of strategic alliances. Journal of
Management Studies, 41: 61–83.
Habermas, J. (1981a). Theory of communicative rationality
Volume I. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge:
Polity. 
Habermas, J. (1981b). Theory of communicative rationality
Volume II. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge:
Polity
Kahaner, L. (1996). Competitive intelligence: from black
ops to boardroom - how businesses gather, analyse
and use information to succeed in the global
marketplace. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Kinnie, N., Swart, J., & Purcell, J. (2004). HR advantage
in the networked organisation. Management
Revue, 15 (3): 288–304.
Kinnie, N., Swart, J., & Purcell, J. (2005). Influences on
the choice of HR system: the network
organization perspective. The International
Journal of Human Resource Management, 16 (6):
1004–1028. 
Lee, G.K., & Cole, R.E. (2003). From a firm-based to a
community-based model of knowledge creation:
the case of Linux Kernel development.
Organization Science, 14 (6): 633–649.
Lin, N. (1999). Building a network theory of social
capital. Connections, 22(1): 28–51.
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge
creating company. Oxford: OUP.
Polanyi, M. (1966). The logic of tacit inference. In
Knowing and Being, essays by Michael Polanyi.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Powell, J., & Bradford, J. (1998). The security-strategy
interface: using qualitative process models to
relate the security function to business
dynamics. Security Journal, 10: 151–160.
Powell J., & Bradford, J. (2000). Targeting intelligence
gathering in a dynamic competitive
environment. Int’l J of Information Management.
20 (3): 181–195.
Powell, J.H., & Swart, J. (2008). Scaling knowledge: how
does knowledge accrue in systems? Journal of
the Operational Research Society, 59 (12):
1633–1643.
20
Purcell, J., Hutchinson, S., Kinnie, N., Swart, J., &
Rayton, B.(2004). Vision and values:
organisational culture and values as a source of
competitive advantage. London: Chartered
Institute of Personnel and Development.
Sandler, T., & Hartley, K. (1995). The economics of
defense. Cambridge Surveys of Economic
Literature. Cambridge: CUP.
Swart, J. (2006). Intellectual capital: disentangling an
enigmatic concept. Journal of Intellectual Capital,
7 (2): 136–159.
Swart, J., & Henneberg, S. (2007). Dynamic knowledge
nets – the 3C model: exploratory findings and
conceptualisation of entrepreneurial knowledge
constellations. Journal of Knowledge Management,
11 (6): 126–141.
Swart, J., & Kinnie, N. (2003). Sharing knowledge in
knowledge intensive firms. Human Resource
Management J, 13 (2): 60–75.
Swart, J. & Kinnie, N. (2010). Organisational learning,
knowledge assets and HR practices in
professional service firms. Human Resource
Management Journal, 64–79.
Swart, J., & Powell, J.H. ( 2005). This is what the fuss is
about: a systemic modelling for organisational
knowing. Journal of Knowledge Management, 9(2):
45–58.
Tsoukas, H. (1996). ‘The firm as a distributed
knowledge system: a constructionist approach.’
Strategic Management Journal, 17, 11-25.
